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How Party Leader Evaluation Affects Party Support 
A Study of Campaign Effects Using a Rolling Cross-Section Design 
 






The rolling cross-section (RCS) is a relatively new and promising technique to study 
campaign dynamics. As there are some important similarities between RCS data and 
the data registered by voting advice applications (VAAs), it is interesting to 
investigate the possibilities of applying RCS methods on VAA data, something that 
has never been done before. In this paper, Dutch VAA data are used to study how 
televised debates of party leaders affect evaluations of these leaders by focusing on 
two left-wing parties, and how these evaluations affect party support during the 
campaign for the 2012 Dutch legislative elections. Results show that the ratings of 
social-democrat party leader Diederik Samsom are boosted by his performance in the 
television debates, and that these increasingly positive evaluations have a positive 
influence on support for his party. No effects of the performance of socialist party 
leader Emile Roemer have been found; however, a strong relation between his 
evaluation and support for the SP could be established. The results are discussed in 
light of the advantages and disadvantages of non-probability VAA datasets. A 
weighting technique is applied to control for selection effects. The findings should be 
taken with caution, as conclusions could not be generalized to the Dutch population. 
However, VAA data do allow examining causal effects, which introduces great 
potential for future research. 
 







The dynamics of parliamentary elections have with no doubt transformed in such a way that 
political leaders are most often in the center of attention (Wattenberg, 1991), instead of their 
party platform and ideology, in what Poguntke and Webb (2005) have defined as 
‘presidentialization of politics’. Regardless of formal constitutional arrangements, the 
personal appeal of political leaders plays an ever-increasing role in a development that has 
been related to the general transformation of previously mass-based parties, characterized as 
political personalization (McAllister, 2007; Garzia, 2011). As traditional sociopolitical 
cleavages are declining in the advanced democracies of Europe and North America (Franklin 
et al., 1992; Dalton and Wattenberg, 2000) party choices appear to be increasingly 
individualized, which implicates “a shift away from a style of electoral decision-making 
based on social group and/or party cues toward a more individualized and inwardly oriented 
style of political choice” (Dalton, 1996: 346). Mair et al. (2004) attribute the transformation 
of the electoral strategies, particularly of social democratic parties, which typically focused 
on certain socioeconomic divisions in the past, to this development. Such a possible outcome 
was already recognized by seminal scholars such as Otto Kirchheimer, who affirmed that “the 
mass integration party, product of an age with harder class lines and more sharply protruding 
denominational structures, is transforming itself into a catch-all ‘people’s’ party” 
(Kirchheimer, 1966: 185). Features of these trends of party and competition transformation 
include de-ideologization, policy platform flexibility, and basing campaigns on features more 
appealing to voters such as leadership (Farrell and Webb, 2000; Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 
Krouwel 2012). Simultaneously, the nature of political communication has shifted to include 
new electronic media channels, which play an important role especially in national elections 




campaigns (Bowler and Farrell, 1992; Glaser and Salmon, 1991). This shift has been crucial 
for transferring the attention focus to party leaders, instead of parties themselves, with the 
latter being “more dependent in their communications with voters on the essentially visual 
and personality-based medium of television” (Mughan, 2000: 129). Contemporary televised 
campaigns often center their attention on the personal qualities of political contenders, 
instead of focusing on programmatic and ideological content, shifting the electoral 
competition to a duel between personalities rather than parties (Cotta and Verzichelli, 2007).  
If democratic politics have indeed become overwhelmingly candidate-centered, one might 
consider that “leaders’ personalities and personal characteristics may…play a large part in 
determining how individuals vote in democratic elections” (King, 2002: 4).  
 
Within political communication research, it is still a debated issue to what extent election 
campaigns really matter for the outcome of elections. Most scientists agree that voters are 
influenced by campaigns, but it is hard to accurately determine the effect of specific 
campaign events. Wlezien (2010) discusses the two main problems: first, campaign events 
only have small effects, and second, most research techniques do not have enough power to 
detect those minor influences. A large opinion poll (N = 1000) with surveys at short intervals 
is needed to detect effects as large as five percentage points in party preference, for example, 
while most effects are smaller. Accordingly, Iyengar & Simon (2000) argue that influences of 
campaigns can be observed more clearly and accurately if researchers a) shift their focus to 
more indirect influences like priming, and b) start using other research methods than cross-
sectional surveys. They argue rolling cross-sectional designs (RCS) are the most promising 
survey design in capturing campaign effects. The RCS is a day-to-day cross-section of the 
electorate during the course of the campaign. Compared to other techniques, such as cross-
sectional time series or a panel design, it is a relatively cost-efficient technique to obtain 




many observations at short time intervals. In addition, it does not suffer from disadvantages 
like panel attrition, conditioning effects of repeatedly asking the same question to the same 
respondent, or time heterogeneity because not all respondents respond on the same day 
(Johnston & Brady, 2002; Romer, Kenski, Winneg, Adasiewicz, & Jamieson, 2006). 
  
This paper explores the possibilities of using the information recorded by Voting Advice 
Applications (VAAs) as a rolling cross-section to study campaign effects. VAAs are 
increasingly popular websites where voters can obtain personalized voting ‘advices’ after 
filling out their opinion towards a selection of statements. In the build-up to elections, ten 
thousands of people visit such websites daily in many European countries (Garzia & 
Marschall, 2012). Like the RCS, the data recorded by VAAs consists of large samples of the 
electorate with different respondents opting in every day. They fill out a set of questions 
regarding political opinions, as well as leadership evaluations and party preferences. This 
kind of data should therefore be suitable for analysing campaign effects using the same 
methods typically applied on RCS data. VAA data has never been used for this purpose 
previously, despite its great potential. Especially political science and communication science 
could profit greatly from using this kind of data in studying campaign effects. 
 
We utilize data collected by the Dutch VAA Kieskompas to study its potential in a RCS 
research design. Kieskompas is the second most popular VAA in the Netherlands, with more 
than 757,000 users completing the test during the 2012 legislative election campaign. In this 
paper, the dynamics of this recent campaign are analysed. The relatively short campaign was 
characterised by large swings of party support in the polls. In particular, the polls showed a 
major fall of the socialist party (SP) and a major rise of the social-democrat labour party 
(PvdA) shortly before Election Day. These dynamics were attributed by many to the good 




performance of PvdA leader Diederik Samsom in important TV debates, and the bad 
performance of SP leader Emile Roemer in the same debates (see for example De Vries, 
2012). This leads to the following research question:  
 
Are voter’s evaluations of PvdA-leader Samsom and SP-leader Roemer affected by 
television debates, and can vote intention for either PvdA or SP on be explained by 
these evaluations of political leaders?  
 
Similar effects of media performance by leaders on party choice have been found previously 







We can roughly distinguish five reasons that leads citizens to vote for a certain party: 
identification with a specific group; performance of the incumbent government (e.g. 
unemployment rate); specific issues a party stands for; strategic motives (to get a specific 
party in government or to keep a specific party out); and the appeal of party leaders (Oegema 
and Kleinnijenhuis, 2000). In political science, there are different perspectives on the relative 
importance of these factors and the role of party leader evaluations in the final party choice. 
An important school of thought adheres to the “funnel model” introduced by Campbell, 
Converse, Miller and Stokes (1960) which, in short, assumes that political socialization 
(which depends on socioeconomic factors) and the resulting ideology and party identification, 




precede and influence other factors that have an effect on one’s party choice, such as party 
leader evaluations. The performance of party leaders therefore should have a relatively small 
impact on the election outcome (Bartle & Crewe, 2002). However, others (e.g. Garzia, 2012; 
Hayes & McAllister, 1997) argue that due to the recent trend of personalization of politics, 
this funnel model is not accurate anymore. One could not assume that ideology is a fixed, 
exogenous variable and that leader preference is a result of it. It might as well be the other 
way around: people report an ideology or identification with a party because of the party 
leader they favor. This implies that leader evaluations might play a crucial role in election 
outcomes. Contrary to this anticipation, there is no established consensus in the literature 
when it comes to how the personal appeal of a political leader affects individual’s party 
choice. Voluminous research has presented empirical evidence in support of the 
personalization hypothesis (Bean and Mughan, 1989; Clarke et al., 2004; Lobo, 2006; Garzia, 
2013), while others have found that leadership effect varies (King, 2002; Curtice and 
Holmberg, 2005; Karvonen, 2010).  
 
This raises the question as to what leader evaluations are based on. Since most voters only 
know party leaders through the media, the way they are presented in it is likely to influence 
voter’s opinion. Oegema and Kleinnijenhuis (2000) mention competence and sympathy as the 
two main features Dutch voters base their evaluations on. The most important theory of 
media impact on citizens’ evaluations of party leaders is priming (Krosnick & Kinder, 1990; 
Scheufele, 2000). According to priming theory, media do not influence individuals’ attitudes 
directly, but rather determine the criteria by which those individuals eventually judge 
politicians. The more attention media pay to a particular issue – a certain action or 
characteristic of the politician – the more central this issue becomes in the overall evaluation 
of that politician. For example, the performance of the Dutch Socialist Party leader Roemer in 




television debates during the 2012 campaign was described by many media sources as 
‘disappointing’. Citizens who consume more news would, according to priming theory, 
therefore become more negative in their evaluation of Roemer. Contrarily, main media 
outlets generally positively evaluated the performance of Dutch Labour leader Samsom, thus 
potentially boosting voter’s perception of the PvdA frontrunner. 
 
We expect to reveal an effect of the television debates on party leader evaluations on the one 
hand, and an effect of party leader evaluations and party support on the other.  
  
Data and Measurement 
 
In this study we use an opt-in, non-probability sample, collected through the online Vote 
Advice Application Kieskompas. VAAs are online applications that enable prospective voters 
to compare their own policy preferences with the stated policy positions of candidates or 
parties running in the election. Due to the ‘instant reward’ of a personalised voting advice, 
VAAs allow us to ask respondents a wide range of policy positions and a larger number of 
background items (such as leadership evaluations and vote propensities) than traditional 
election surveys. During the campaign for the 2012 Dutch legislative elections, VAA 
Kieskompas was online for 29 days, from August 15 to Election Day, September 12, 2012. 
During this time Kieskompas was consulted more than 1.2 million times, with 757,052 users 
fully completing the questionnaire. For every visit, a log file was recorded containing the 
answers user gave to all questions and statements, and metadata such as the time of arrival at 
the website and the time it took the user to answer all questions. On the initial page of the 
VAA, users were asked to fill out their age, sex, and highest level of education, which was 
done by 74.6% of them. Before receiving their personalized advice, users were asked to give 




their propensity to vote for each party on an 11-point scale ranging from 0 (would never vote 
for party) to 10 (would most likely vote for party; see Van der Eijk, Van der Brug, Kroh, & 
Franklin, 2006). The response rate was 61.1%. Furthermore, next to an empathy evaluation, 
users were also asked to rate the extent to which party leaders are “capable of being a Prime 
Minister” on similar 11-point scale ranging from 0 (not capable at all) to 10 (very capable; 
response rate of 65.7%).  
 
In order to obtain a selection of users who filled out the VAA seriously, responses of users 
who finished within one minute, who reported the same opinion towards all statements, and 
who were younger than 18 years (thus not eligible to vote) were omitted. Because 
observations with missing values to any of the relevant variables were deleted list-wise, the 
final sample consists of 455,249 observations (60.1% of the Kieskompas users who 
completed the test). It is important to note that this sample is not representative for the Dutch 
electorate. Men are overrepresented (59.2% is male) and so are the highly educated (59.4% 
have attended either college or university). Based on the relatively high educational level of 
Kieskompas users, we assume that there is also an overrepresentation of politically interested 
citizens. 
 
The resulting data was analyzed as if it were rolling cross-section data. In short, in a rolling 
cross-section, every day a cross-section of the population is interviewed, which allows for 
very close monitoring of campaign dynamics. Traditionally, campaign effects, such as the 
influence of important events like TV-debates between candidates, have often been studied 
using (pooled) cross-sectional time series designs with measurement points (or waves) before 
and after the event (Iyengar & Simon, 2000). The influence of the event on the dependent 
variable (e.g. party choice) was measured by comparing the two measurement moments. 




There are two important disadvantages of this approach, however. First, this can only be done 
to study the effect of expected events, since the research design should anticipate on the 
timing of the event. A RCS makes it possible to more accurately detect changes in trends and 
could, for example, show more precisely when a change in the trend occurs, while on the 
basis of cross-sectional time series designs a change would be assigned to important events 
between measurement points (Brady & Johnston, 2006). Second, not all respondents can be 
reached and interviewed on the same day, so one measurement point actually entails several 
days (Johnston & Brady, 2002; Romer et al., 2006). This means that additional heterogeneity 
over time is captured in measuring campaign effects and party preferences. In other words, 
those interviewed later differ from those interviewed earlier, both in individual characteristics 
(interest in politics, occupation, etcetera) and context (campaign effects may affect opinions 
during the interview; Johnston & Brady, 2002). The rolling cross-section turns this problem 
into a virtue: if each day a new sample is ‘released’ to the interviewers, over the course of a 
campaign there are no systematic differences between people who are interviewed on 
different days. Late responders belonging to an earlier sample are interviewed on the same 
day as early responders in a later sample, making the selection of people being interviewed 
on a certain day effectively random (Johnston & Brady, 2002).  
 
RCS also have advantages over panel surveys as larger samples can be obtained (this is too 
expensive for a panel), that do not suffer from panel attrition (resulting in less representative 
samples) or subject fatigue (respondents getting bored from answering the same question 
every time). Because of these reasons, a panel can also not be interviewed each single day 
(Romer et al., 2006). 
 




As discussed above, VAA data share some important characteristics with RCS data and might 
therefore likewise be a superior source of information for some research designs, especially 
when large samples are needed in testing effects over time during election campaigns. 
Probably the most important differences between VAA data and RCS data as described by 
Johnston and Brady (2002) are that a) VAA data are not as representative of the electorate as 
RCS samples (men and higher educated people are often overrepresented – Hirzalla, van 
Zoonen, & de Ridder, 2010; Hooghe & Teepe, 2007) and b) the moment at which one visits 
the VAA website might not be as random as the timing of being interviewed in the RCS 
design. Previous research found that in the beginning of the campaign, more politically 
interested people will fill out the VAA because they are the first to know that the application 
is available, and in the last few days before election day there will be more indecisive voters 
who are in need of an advice (Van de Pol, Holleman, Kamoen, Krouwel & De Vreese, 2014). 
Characteristics of these different types of users, and therefore also the opinions and 
preferences they report, might be different, which would result in a bias.  
 
To resolve these issues we weighted the data in two ways: First, we weighted the daily 
averages of all party and leader ratings on the characteristics age, sex and education, to make 
sure the distribution of age, sex and education is kept constant across time. As a result, the 
composition of respondents is similar for each day, and campaign dynamics in our results 
cannot be attributed to differences in respondents per day. Second, we weighted the complete 
dataset to match population parameters to make sure the weighted sample is representative 
for the Dutch population on age, sex and education.  
 
Analyses 




To study the suitability of VAA data for capturing campaign dynamics and to answer our 
research question on the effects of TV debates on party leader evaluation and of party leader 
evaluations on party preferences, we proceed as follows. First, the campaign dynamics as 
captured by the VAA data are compared to traditional public opinion polls and other accounts 
of the 2012 national election campaign. In the second part of our analysis section, we analyse 
the relation between campaign effects like important TV debates and changes in party leader 
ratings. 
 
Dynamics in the Dutch 2012 election campaign 
 
The campaign for the 2012 Dutch legislative elections was marked by a very large swing in 
vote intentions between the SP and the PvdA. Both parties competed for the vote of left-wing 
voters, and at the start of the campaign the SP triumphed in the polls. However, as Election 
Day approached, many voters switched their vote intention to the PvdA, hoping this party 
would become large enough to defeat the incumbent right-wing VVD. Figure 1 shows an 
overview of the polls during the last weeks of the campaign. The steep fall of the SP and the 
sharp rise of the PvdA are clearly visible between 28 August and 8 September. The 
popularity of other parties was relatively stable. 
 





Figure 1. Election polls (seats per party) for the final weeks of the 2012 election campaign. 




Figure 2 shows the parties preferred by users of the Kieskompas VAA in the same period of 
time. The figure shows similar dynamics: the popularity of PvdA (black thick line) increases 























































popularity is similar but not exactly the same, as Kieskompas is mostly used by left-wing 
people (this bias does not disappear when weighting on age, sex and education). The vertical 
lines indicate TV debates; on August 26 (the 12th day of Kieskompas being online) the crucial 
“RTL Premiersdebat” took place, in which PvdA leader Samsom outperformed SP leader 
Roemer, according to commentators. After this moment the discourse in the strategic news 
coverage changed in favor of the leader of the PvdA (see Nieuwsmonitor, 2012). The steepest 
increase in propensity to vote PvdA is visible after the 12th day in the campaign. The average 
propensity to vote for SP does not decrease; this relates to the propensity-of-vote measure 
being  
 
Figure 3 shows that a similar dynamic is visible among VAA users in terms of leader ratings. 
This figure shows day by day how Kieskompas users evaluate all party leaders on their 
capability to be prime minister. Again, the thick black line identifies the ratings of the social 
democrats, and specifically their leader Samsom, and the thick grey line indicates the ratings 
of Socialist Party leader Roemer.  
 
 




































Figure 3 shows that the ratings of most party leaders remained relatively stable throughout 
the campaign, with one important exception: the evaluation of the leader of PvdA-leader 
Samsom increases sharply after the first TV debates and continues to rise until Election Day. 
This increase in popularity is in line with other analyses of the 2012 election campaign 
(Nieuwsmonitor, 2012), confirming that VAA data is capable of identifying the same 
dynamics, only with a much greater precision regarding the exact timing of mass preference 
changes. 
 
Another smaller change in Figure 3 can be seen in the evaluations of party leader Van der 
Staaij (of the Christian right-wing SGP), whose rating suddenly plummeted after a 
controversial remark he made on the likelihood of women who were raped to get pregnant. 
 
Effects of leadership rating on party preferences 
 
Johnston and Brady (2006; 2002) argue that in order to draw causal conclusions about 
campaign effects, a statistical test of the association between predictors and vote preference 
should be complemented with a figure showing the trend of the values. This figure is helpful 
in determining the causal order of events. Below, we included figures for both PvdA (figure 
5a) and SP (figure 5b) showing the trend in capability ratings of the party leaders and party 
support. The days count from the first day that Kieskompas was available (August 15) until 
the 29th day, which was Election Day (September 12). The red lines in the figures represent 
the party leader evaluation (on a scale from 0 to 10) and the blue lines the average propensity 
to vote for the party. The vertical lines indicate the television debates during the campaign, 
which were claimed by many to be crucial moments in the campaign. In national opinion 




polls, Samsom was declared to be winner and Roemer loser of the “Premiersdebat” on 
August 26 (the 12th day). According to the polls, Samsom also won the “KnvB 
Lijsttrekkersdebat” (the 16th day), as well as the “RTL Lijsttrekkersdebat” (the 21st day).  
 
The rating of Samsom increased considerably during the campaign. Before the first debate 
(which received less attention than later debates) a small increase was already visible, but the 
large shift begins only after this debate, and before the first “crucial” ‘Premiersdebat’. The 
capability rating of Samsom increases from an average of 5 to 6.5 between the 9th and the 23rd 
day, between which the most important debates took place. We can argue with respect to 
figure 4a that the TV-debates did not evoke a rise in the capability ratings of Samsom, since 
the rating was increasing already before the debates started and there was no important 
change in the trend right after a particular debate. Rather, it seems that the increasing 
appreciation of Samsom was accelerated by the debates. Another observation that could be 
made is that the change in the ratings of Samsom seem to precede the increase in popularity 
for the PvdA, which was quite flat until some days after the steep increase in Samsom’s 
popularity. 
 
Figure 4a. Capability rating of Samsom and support for the PvdA. 
Rating Samsom



















In contrast to this, the ratings of Roemer were very stable, as can be seen in Figure 4b. After 
the first debate, the daily average shows a small peak followed by a small dip after, but 
Roemer did not participate in this debate so there could not be an effect of his debate 




Figure 4b. Capability rating of Roemer and support for the SP 
 
In general, the figures show a strong relation between the capability rating of the party leader 
and the support for the party. The figures do not seem to give the impression that there is any 
effect of Roemer’s evaluation on the support for the PvdA, or vice versa. In the next sections, 
we will analyse the relation between leadership rating and party preference in detail. 
 
Relation with issue agreement 
 
Rating Roemer


















As mentioned above, the most interesting dynamic in the campaign was the switch in 
popularity between the SP and the PvdA, which seems to be a direct result from the leader’s 
performance and the media coverage of the campaign. To illustrate this, figure 5 shows the 
relation between issue agreement, party leader capability evaluation, and party support.  
 
Figure 6. Relation between the propensity to vote for the party (line) and issue agreement 
(area), for PvdA and SP. 
 
There is hardly any relation between dynamics in agreement with parties on issues, and the 
party support; especially when it concerns the PvdA (left panel of figure 5). There might be a 
small increase in agreement but this does not seem to be related to the sharp increase in party 
support; neither with the PvdA nor with the SP. 
 
Conditional change model 
 
To test the relationship between leader evaluation and party preference, a conditional change 
model is applied to the VAA data. Application of this model to RCS data is described by 





























the time of filling out the questionnaire, controlled for the pre-campaign likelihood to vote, in 
order to capture the campaign effect1. This pre-campaign baseline is (obviously) not 
measured by the VAA. However, it can be estimated by including the normalized values of 
leader ratings, which is the rating reported by an individual on a certain day, minus the mean 
rating of all individuals on that day (see Johnston & Brady, 2002; and Johnston, 2008, for an 
extensive discussion of this procedure). This procedure is based on the assumption that the 
change in leader evaluation is the same across all people. This is a rather strong but necessary 
assumption, as a real baseline measurement is lacking. 
Table 1 shows the effect of capability ratings for Samsom (model 1) and Samsom and 
Roemer (model 2) on the preference for the social-democratic PvdA, controlled for the pre-
campaign baseline preference (cross-sectional variance kept constant). Similarly, table 2 
shows the impact of capability ratings for Roemer (model 3) and Roemer and Samsom 
(model 4) on the preference for the socialist SP, keeping cross-sectional variance constant. 
 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 If this baseline voting likelihood is not controlled for, longitudinal effects would be confounded by cross-
sectional effects because of the correlation between the leader evaluation at the time of interview and the 
omitted leader evaluation at t = 0. In other words, the cross-sectional variance should be separated from 
temporal variance. 




Table 1. OLS regression of voting preference for PvdA 
 Model 1 Model 2 
 b s.e. b s.e. 
Capability rating Samsom 0.6228 (0.0062)*** 0.6344 (0.0062)*** 
Baseline rating Samsom 0.1631 (0.0066)*** 0.0976 (0.0066)*** 
Age -0.0014 (0.0003)*** -0.0015 (0.0003)*** 
Female 0.3280 (0.0089)*** 0.2918 (0.0089)*** 
Education -0.0023 (0.0005)*** -0.0037 (0.0005)*** 
Capability rating Roemer   0.0007 (0.0430) 
Baseline rating Roemer   0.1396 (0.0431)** 
     
Intercept 1.8208 (0.0401)*** 1.7575 (0.2007)*** 
     
R2 0.40  0.41  
N 306,070  300,104  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Model 1 in table 1 shows a strong positive effect of Samsom’s capability rating on support 
for the PvdA. On an 11-point scale, an increase of one point in the rating of Samsom is equal 
to an increase of 0.62 point in the likelihood to vote PvdA, controlled for cross-sectional 
variance, age, sex and education. Explained variance is high as well: R2 = 40%. In model 2, 
the rating of the capability of Roemer to be prime minister is added (controlled for the 
baseline), but this coefficient is not significant, neither does it affect the impact of Samsom’s 
rating. The explained variance is increased by one per cent, which is due to the inclusion of 
an additional variable - the baseline rating for Roemer. 
 
  




Table 2. OLS regression of voting preference for SP 
 Model 3 Model 4 
 b s.e. b s.e. 
Capability rating Roemer 0.7867 (0.0434)*** 0.8755 (0.0436)*** 
Baseline rating Roemer 0.0170 (0.0435) -0.1048 (0.0436)* 
Age -0.0007 (0.0003)* 0.0009 (0.0003)** 
Female 0.3434 (0.0092)*** 0.3214 (0.0093)*** 
Education 0.0034 (0.0005)*** 0.0042 (0.0005)*** 
Capability rating Samsom   0.1992 (0.0063)*** 
Baseline rating Samsom   -0.0734 (0.0067)*** 
Intercept 0.7176 (0.1970)*** -0.9314 (0.2039)*** 
     
R2 0.46  0.47  
N 305,774  299,257  
Note: * p<0.05; ** p<0.01; *** p<0.001 
 
Model 3 in table 2 shows the effect of the rating of Roemer’s capability to be prime minister 
on support for the SP, controlled for the baseline and for age, sex and education. The impact 
of Roemer’s rating on support for the SP is even higher than the impact of Samsom’s rating 
on support for the PvdA: with an increase in Roemer’s rating of one point, the likelihood of 
voting SP is increased by 0.79 points. R2 is also higher: 46% of the variance in party support 
is explained by model 3. In model 4, the impact of Samsom’s rating (controlled for the 
baseline) is included. Surprisingly, Samsom’s rating has a positive impact: an increase in 




Figure 5a suggests that a positive trend in the popularity of Samsom is at least boosted by his 
performance in TV-debates: between the first and the last debate, his average rating increases 
with almost 14 percentage points. On the other hand, the performance of SP leader Roemer, 
which was negatively evaluated in the media, seems to not have affected his capability 
ratings during the campaign. The TV-debates clearly have no influence on the socialist leader.  





There is a strong relation between the capability ratings of both politicians and the likelihood 
of voting for their parties. In addition, there is a (weaker) relation between the rating for 
Samsom and the likelihood of voting SP. In order to draw conclusions about causality, 
however, we need to take figures 4a and 4b into account as well. Figure 5a shows clearly that 
the rise in support for the PvdA is preceded by an increase in the rating of Samsom, at least 
from the 9th day on. This points at a causal influence of the evaluations of Samsom on the 
support for the PvdA. The picture is different for SP however; there is a strong correlation 
between the capability ratings for Roemer and the support for the SP, but since there is no 
substantial change in the trend of either parameter, one cannot judge whether one influences 
the other or vice versa. It is also not possible to draw causal conclusions about the influence 
of Samsom’s ratings on the support for the SP. Interestingly, the results in Figure 5 show no 
clear relationship between agreement with the policy preferences of the two parties and 





This paper has made clear that, first, there are many advantages to RCS methods over other 
methods to study campaign effects, and second, VAA data offers great research opportunities 
when RCS methods are applied to them. The data are superior to cross-sectional data and 
two-wave cross-sectional time series data when it comes to (precisely) identifying causes and 
effects, and they trump panel data when it comes to the possible amount of measurement 
points and the possible number of observations. For example, with such a large number of 
observations the graphical estimations of trends in leader evaluations and party support will 




be more precise, as it “smoothens out” the noise due to measurement error (Brady & Johnston, 
2006). The large sample size also results in more powerful statistical tests, but those do not 
necessarily require such a large sample.  
 
There are, however, also some drawbacks to the usage of VAA data for this purpose, 
compared to “regular” rolling cross-sectional data, as described by Johnston and Brady (2006; 
2002; 2008). An important disadvantage is that there is a limit to the number of items that can 
be included in VAAs. People visit such applications to receive a voting advice, and do not 
want to be burdened by many questions that are irrelevant to the eventual advice. 
Consequently, this reduces the possible applications of such data. In this paper, for example, 
it was not possible to control for other explanations of party choice and for spurious effects. 
A second important disadvantage, as mentioned before, is that the sample captured by VAAs 
is not representative of most populations of interest (often the electorate). The selection of 
people visiting Kieskompas is biased towards higher educated, politically interested citizens 
compared to those visiting the most popular Dutch VAA, Stemwijzer. However, using 
weighting techniques we were able to give groups that are underrepresented among 
Kieskompas users more weight as to make the sample representative on age, sex and 
education. 
 
Related to this is the fact that the timing of visits to Kieskompas are probably not completely 
random, which is necessary if one wants to assume that differences over time would 
completely be due to factors “associated with the passage of time” (Johnston, 2008) like 
campaign events. It is not inconceivable that there is some selection in the timing of visits. 
For example, the news of the launch of a VAA will reach an audience of mainly politically 
interested citizens, so they will probably be the main visitors on the first days the VAA is 




online. In the last days before Election Day, much more people will know of the tool and 
perhaps relatively more indecisive people use it to really find out which party to vote for. A 
possible consequence could be that campaign effects are overestimated in the last part of the 
campaign, because people who have not yet decided about their vote are more susceptible to 
election campaign effects (Fournier, Nadeau, Blais, Gidengil, & Nevitte, 2004). However, 
this problem could also be overcome by weighting: based on age, education, sex and vote 
certainty weights were calculated and employed to make sure the composition of respondents 
is constant across days and campaign dynamics found in our sample could not be attributed to 
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